THE FALLACIES OF THE NEW THEORY OF REFERENCE

The so-called New Theory of Reference (Marcus, Kripke etc.) is inspire d by the insight that in modal and intensional contexts quantifiers pr esuppose nondescriptive unanalyzable identity criteria which do not re duce to any descriptive conditions. From this valid insight the New Th eorists fallaciously move to the idea that free singular terms can exh ibit a built-in direct reference and that there is even a special clas s of singular terms (proper names) necessarily exhibiting direct refer ence. This fallacious move has been encouraged by a mistaken belief in the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, by the myth of the de re reference, and a mistaken assimilation of ''direct reference'' t o ostensive (perspectival) identification. The de dicto vs. de re cont rast does not involve direct reference, being merely a matter of rule- ordering (''scope''). The New Theorists' thesis of the necessity of id entities of directly referred-to individuals is a consequence of an un motivated and arbitrary restriction they tacitly impose on the identif ication of individuals.