Deregulation of public enterprises and services by privatization is ve
ry fashionable nowadays. The aim of privatization is mainly to increas
e effectiveness, while the government itself likes to maximize its rev
enue at the occasion of the takeover. Most of these public enterprises
show a shortage in investment while maintenance of a reasonable emplo
yment level in the new private firm is also strongly desirable, not to
mention the ecological obligations imposed on the new private firm. I
t means that takeover bids have to face multiple nontransitive objecti
ves and several parties interested in the issue even several decision
makers. Traditionally the optimization of all these objectives are the
n judged upon case by case in a rather subjective way. Consequently th
ere is a need for a more general and objective, not to say scientific,
method which can compare several takeover bids for privatization opti
mizing multiple objectives sometimes with different units of measureme
nt. With that purpose, the Privata model was developed. Privata takes
into consideration upper limits, lower bounds, dominating and nondomin
ating effects, ending up with a set of nondominated takeover bids, whi
ch are ranked by using the reference point theory based on the maximal
criterion values. In this way objectivity and decreasing marginal uti
lity are fully respected. A theoretical explanation is followed by a s
imulation on several takeover bids for a public enterprise given multi
ple objectives.