HOW DO WE TELL AN ASSOCIATION FROM A RULE - COMMENT

S.A. Sloman's (1996) intriguing argument for separate associative and rule-based reasoning systems is unfortunately damaged by a certain amo unt of slack in the distinction he makes between these two posited men tal mechanisms. The authors suggest that the distinction could be shar pened by overt reference to explicit models of associative and rule-ba sed processing. They also point out that ''simultaneous contradictory belief,'' which Sloman takes as evidence for separate associative and rule-based systems, need not be interpreted in this fashion. It may al so signal a number of other things, including the presence of linguist ic ambiguity (as in the Linda problem), competing lines of formal reas oning (as in the Wason selection task), and unclarified assumptions (a s in the 3 doors problem).