ON THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF GENERALIZATIONS IN THE SOCIAL-SCIENCES

This article disputes the common view that social science explanations depend on discovery of lawlike generalizations from which description s of social outcomes can be derived. It distinguishes between governin g and phenomenal regularities, and argues that social regularities are phenomenal rather than governing. In place of nomological deductive a rguments, the article maintains that social explanations depend on the discovery of casual mechanisms underlying various social processes. T he metaphysical correlate of this argument is that there are no social kinds: types of social entities that share a common casual constituti on giving rise to strong regularities of behavior. The article turns n ext to a consideration of the character of social causation and argues for a microfoundational interpretation of social causation: social ca usal powers are embodied in the constraints and opportunities that ins titutions present to individual agents. Finally, it is noted that thes e arguments have consequences for the credibility of social prediction s: it is argued that predictions in social science are generally unrel iable.