Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show th
at 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spati
al concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolm
an, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of
landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu
Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space hel
d by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are al
so summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to h
ave a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler
explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably
possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to elimina
te these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusio
n caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map.
I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for e
lucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term s
hould be avoided.