MAKING PSYCHOLOGY INCORRUPTIBLE

This piper is a response to criticisms, by Peterson (1995) and others, of positions I took in an earlier article, ''Manifesto for a science of clinical psychology'' (McFall, 1991). I had argued that professiona l practice and training in clinical psychology must be governed by a s cientific epistemology, and had outlined some of the specific reasons and implications. In this article, I attempt to correct misinterpretat ions of my previous arguments, to clarify ambiguities, and to fill any serious omissions. The fundamental points of the original Manifesto a re defended, buttressed, and extended. In response to issues highlight ed by the criticisms, two new corollaries are added to those offered i n the original article. These summarize the arguments presented in thi s paper, with special emphasis on the essential role of skepticism as the best protection against the corruption of knowledge and practice i n psychology.