THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION IN THE EARLY CONGRESS - THE CASE OF THE COMPENSATION ACT OF 1816

Theory: We extend research on the electoral connection ''beyond'' the modern Congress to the Congress of the early 1800s. Our analysis shows evidence of individual accountability in voting on the Compensation A ct of 1816 and in decisions to run for reelection in the 1816 election . Hypotheses: An electoral connection should produce a marginality eff ect in voting on the Compensation Act (vulnerable legislators less lik ely to vote yea), and surplus retirements among yea voters. Methods: L ogistic regressions with vote on the Compensation Act and retirement d ecisions as dependent variables. Independent variables are electoral s afety, age, party affiliation, and (for the latter regression) vote on the Compensation Act. Results: Electorally vulnerable legislators wer e less likely to support the Compensation Act. Supporters of that prop osal were less likely to seek reelection. Both of these findings are c onsistent with the existence of an electoral connection, and persist a fter controls for other factors such as age, party affiliation, and el ectoral safety.