OBJECTIVITY AND THE DOUBLE-STANDARD FOR FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES

The emphasis on the limitations of objectivity, in specific guises and networks, has been a continuing theme of contemporary analytic philos ophy for the past few decades. The popular sport of baiting feminist p hilosophers - into pointing to what's left out of objective knowledge, or into describing what methods, exactly, they would offer to replace the powerful ''objective'' methods grounding scientific knowledge - e mbodies a blatant double standard which has the effect of constantly p utting feminist epistemologists on the defensive, on the fringes, on t he run. This strategy can only work if 'objectivity' is transparent, s imple, stable, and clear in its meaning. It most certainly is not. In face, taking 'objectivity' as a sort of beautiful primitive, self-evid ent in its value, and all-powerful in its revelatory power, requires c areless philosophy, and the best workers in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science have made reworked definitions of 'objectiv ity' absolutely central to their own projects. In fact, classic femini st concerns with exploring the impact of sex and gender on knowledge, understanding, and other relations between human beings and the rest o f the world fall squarely within the sort of human and social settings that are already considered central in most current analytic metaphys ics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. I argue that the burden of proof is clearly on those who wish to reject the centrality and rel evance of sex and gender to our most fundamental philosophical work on knowledge and reality.