GENERATING AND MAINTAINING COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL-RELATIONS - AMODEL OF REPEATED INTERACTION AMONG GROUPS IN COMPLEX AND UNCERTAIN SITUATIONS

One important change in the Post Cold War international landscape is t he emergence of a number of reconstituted nation-states. Because of si gnificant and continuing domestic political change, economic volatilit y, ''newness'' of bureaucratic institutions, factional divisions, and unstable leadership, the behavior of reconstituted nation-states is vo latile, uncertain, and difficult to predict. This creates a more compl ex and difficult decision environment for both established and reconst ituted nation-states and makes the task of generating and maintaining cooperative security regimes more problematic. Can established nation- states develop stable cooperative relationships with reconstituted nat ion-states? Can they maintain established cooperative security regimes ? To address these questions, the relations between established and re constituted nation-states are modeled as a repeated coordination probl em (a mutual fate control game) where nation-states are represented as groups that employ adaptive decision rules; tit for tat for establish ed nation-states and trial and error for reconstituted nation-states. An analysis of the model reveals that groups can achieve stable cooper ative relationships with relative ease. However, cooperative outcomes hinge on the ability of groups to maintain cohesiveness; a difficult t ask for reconstituted nation-states.