ON THE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE FOR ADVERSE DECISIONS

In a criminal trial, the prosecution needs to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. When an individual is accused of wrongdoing outside the criminal process, as when teachers and politicians are charged wit h sexual harassment and employees are charged with financial improprie ties, people often assume that a similarly stringent standard of proof applies. Yet this transfer from criminal law model to other settings is mistaken. When the value of freedom from incarceration is absent, a nd other values are present, probabilities of ''guilt'' less than ''be yond a reasonable doubt,'' perhaps only a mere possibility, are often socially, statistically, and morally legitimate bases for adverse deci sions. Relatedly, although sound reasons for the criminal law's refusa l to cumulate multiple low-probability accusations exist, the reasons for such refusal are often inapt in other settings. Taking adverse dec isions based on cumulating multiple low-probability charges is often j ustifiable both morally and mathematically.