The concept of inhibition was introduced into psychology and physiolog
y at the beginning of the 19th century. Although it was quickly adapte
d to account for a wide range of phenomena in both disciplines, questi
ons were soon raised about its real explanatory power. Some of the obj
ections were on logical and scientific grounds but many were to the ve
ry notion that an inhibitory process could be an active one. Despite m
any analytical reviews and attempted redefinitions, no clarification r
esulted. Partly this was due to the influence of a variety of unstated
philosophical and social-ideological assumptions about the phenomena
for which inhibition was used. In this paper, some of these issues are
explored in relation to ''insanity,'' hypnosis, and normal thinking a
nd willing. Particular attention is paid to Alexander Bain's theory of
the will which David Ferrier attempted to locate in his hypothesised
frontal inhibitory-motor centers. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.