COMMUNITY, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COMMON GRAZING - THE CASE OF POST-SOCIALIST MONGOLIA

This article applies collective-action and transaction-cost theory to the theoretical debate around the management of common property regime s (CPRs), with supporting evidence from recent empirical research in M ongolian pastoralism. Rather than treating CPR management as an activi ty in isolation, as much of the existing literature tends to do, this study examines the use of common grazing in the context of other aspec ts of pastoral livelihoods The more a given group of herders find reas on to co-operate with each other across a range of activities, it is a rgued, the more likely it is that they will also overcome the transact ion costs invoked in controlling the use of the commons. The empirical analysis finds that incentives for cooperation were weakened under ag ricultural collectivisation (1950s-1980s), with possible adverse conse quences for the commons. Decollectivisation from the early 1990s has s een the re-emergence of autonomous co-operation among herders, accompa nied by changes in intra-community dynamics, which together suggest co ntradictory trends for the future management of common grazing.