BIMODALITY OF FORMAL ONTOLOGY AND MEREOLOGY

From the distinctions between ''ontology'' and ''logic'' and between ' 'formal'' and ''material'' we obtain two basic oppositions. Keeping th e term ''ontology'' constant yields the opposition between ''formal on tology'' and ''material ontology''. This raises a question: when one s peaks of ontology, how can its formal aspects be distinguished from it s material ones? If, instead, we keep the term ''formal'' constant, th e opposition is between ''formal ontology'' and ''formal logic''. The question here is therefore: when we talk about ''formal'' how can we d istinguish between logic and ontology? Starting from these questions, I propose to update the somewhat old distinction between formal ontolo gy as the domain of the distributive-collective opposition and materia l ontology as the domain of the parts-whole oppositions. (C) 1995 Acad emic Press Limited