CONGRESS, CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS, AND THE COST-BENEFIT STATE

Authors
Citation
Cr. Sunstein, CONGRESS, CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS, AND THE COST-BENEFIT STATE, Stanford law review, 48(2), 1996, pp. 247-309
Citations number
168
Categorie Soggetti
Law
Journal title
ISSN journal
00389765
Volume
48
Issue
2
Year of publication
1996
Pages
247 - 309
Database
ISI
SICI code
0038-9765(1996)48:2<247:CCMATC>2.0.ZU;2-E
Abstract
In this article, Cass Sunstein explores the 104th Congress' attempts a t regulatory reform. Professor Sunstein believes that the election of this Congress, with its distinctive approach to government, signals th e dawning of a ''constitutional moment'' in which the role of governme nt at all levels will be reexamined. Without full public support for s weeping changes in government, this moment has not yet materialized. W hen and if it does, regulatory reform will be one of its aspects. Inde ed the nation has already begun to examine regulation to determine if the benefits justify the costs. Unfortunately, the 104th Congress has, thus far, failed adequately to address this burgeoning cost-benefit s tate. Sunstein claims that Congress' failure reflects its inability to redesign the massive federal regulatory scheme. He suggests that the executive branch should oversee regulatory reform, with Congress releg ated to providing broad policy direction. Sunstein also suggests that Congress adopt an Administrative Substance Act, building upon the rece nt learning about the performance of regulation and modeled after the Administrative Procedure Act. Sunstein further calls for the enactment of a ''substantive supermandate'' requiring a general background rule of cost-benefit balancing for all federal regulation; but he contends that any description of costs and benefits should reflect the full ra nge of diverse values expressed by the public at large.