LIBERALISM, AUTONOMY, AND MORAL CONFLICT

In this article, Professor Gardbaum presents an account of liberalism in which a particular conception of the ideal of autonomy is an essent ial and constitutive value. This account, which distinguishes between the liberal state's relative indifference as to which substantial ways of life its citizens choose to adopt and its promotion of choice as t he basis on which they are adopted, provides the basis for Professor G ardbaum's distinctively liberal critique of political liberalism and i ts requirement of state impartiality toward its citizens' conflicting ideals, including the ideal of autonomy. He argues that by taking the central task of political theory to be that of accommodating the ''pro blem'' of moral conflict in society, political liberalism misconceives the essential nature of the liberal enterprise. Such dissensus should be understood less as the problem to which liberalism is the solution than as the characteristic product of the liberal commitment to the i deal of autonomy. Accordingly he contends, political liberalism's atte mpt to justify liberal political principles without relying on controv ersial ideals fails. Professor Gardbaum claims that freeing the libera l state from the false constraint of impartiality permits it to rake i ts duty to enhance choice seriously, which means that autonomy should be promoted as a substantive rather than only as a formal value.