THE CONVERGENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES OF APPROXIMATING SIGNALING GAMES

Authors
MANELLI AM
Citation
Am. Manelli, THE CONVERGENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES OF APPROXIMATING SIGNALING GAMES, Economic theory, 7(2), 1996, pp. 323-335
Citations number
28
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
Economic theory → ACNP
ISSN journal
09382259
Volume
7
Issue
2
Year of publication
1996
Pages
323 - 335
Database
ISI
SICI code
0938-2259(1996)7:2<323:TCOESO>2.0.ZU;2-0
Abstract
For a class of infinite signaling games, the perfect Bayesian equilibr ium strategies of finite approximating games converge to equilibrium s trategies of the infinite game. This proves the existence of perfect B ayesian equilibrium for that class of games. It is well known that in general, equilibria may not exist in infinite signaling games.