Rg. Hansen et Jr. Lott, EXTERNALITIES AND CORPORATE OBJECTIVES IN A WORLD WITH DIVERSIFIED SHAREHOLDER CONSUMERS, Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 31(1), 1996, pp. 43-68
If shareholders own diversified portfolios, and if companies impose ex
ternalities on one another, shareholders do not want value maximizatio
n to be corporate policy. Instead, shareholders want companies to maxi
mize portfolio values. This occurs when firms internalize between-firm
externalities. Any kind of externality, pecuniary or nonpecuniary, ve
rtical or horizontal, suffices. What matters is simply that one compan
y's actions affect another's value, Thus, besides the traditional bene
fit of risk reduction, portfolio diversification offers additional ben
efits to shareholders through helping internalize externalities. This
paper documents the extent of diversification and cross-ownership of s
tocks among companies where these externalities are likely to be large
and provides a capital market test of how merger offers vary with the
extent of cross-ownership.