Ecological psychology comprises two fundamental complementary areas of
study: perception and action, as introduced by the American psycholog
ist, J.J. Gibson and the Russian physiologist, Nikolai A. Bernstein, r
espectively. For Gibson perception is the direct pick-up of invariant
information by which animals control their actions to reach environmen
tal goals, not the passive registration of elementary sensations from
which experiences are (unconsciously) inferred or computed. Where Gibs
on rejects the computer metaphor in the study of perception, Bernstein
rejects the executive metaphor in the study of action. Both views cha
llenge psychology to develop a functionally integrated organism-enviro
nment system, governed by laws, in the place of a psychology of intern
al states or isolatable faculties, governed by rules. Here the smalles
t unit of analysis is taken to be the perceiving-acting cycle situated
in intentional contexts. The historical motivation of ecological psyc
hology is reviewed and critically discussed.