It was hypothesized that in a competitive interaction in which an oppo
nent first used threats and fines a) subjects would use the highest le
vel of coercion that could be justified by the available norms, b) sub
jects would be inhibited by a norm that justified using only low level
s of coercion, but c) when the opponent used a magnitude of coercion w
hich exceeded the norm, subjects would also violate the norm and retal
iate with an equally high magnitude of coercion, and d) subjects would
use the maximum levels of coercion when engaging in a competitive gam
e without norms. These hypotheses were examined in a 3 x 2 factorial e
xperiment in which the amount of coercion allowable by a norm (Low Nor
m, High Norm, and No Information) and the level of coercion (Low or Hi
gh) were manipulated, As predicted, aggressive reactions by subjects w
ere inhibited when the provoker conformed to a low norm by using a low
level of coercion, On the other hand, subjects retaliated by using a
high level of coercion when the level of coercion used by a provoker v
iolated the norm, Subjects who could justify their behavior by the ava
ilability of a high punitive norm tended to use all of the coercive po
wer available to them even when the provoker used a low level of coerc
ion. (C) 1996 Wiley-Liss, Inc.