This essay summarizes and critically evaluates the conceptual underpin
nings of Classical (or Rational) Deterrence Theory. The paradigm's ori
gins are traced to Realist political thought and balance of power poli
tics. Two distinct, yet compatible, strands of the theory are identifi
ed: Structural Deterrence and Decision-Theoretic Deterrence Theory. St
ructural (or Neorealist) Deterrence Theory sees the key to internation
al stability in the distribution of power within the system in general
, and among the great powers in particular. By contrast, Decision-Theo
retic Deterrence Theory focuses upon the interplay of outcomes, prefer
ences and rational choices in determining interstate conflict behavior
. The critical deductions of both strands of the theory are at odds wi
th the empirical record and each is hard put to explain the stability
of the post-war period. As well, mainstream Decision-Theoretic Deterre
nce Theory is logically inconsistent. The essay concludes with a brief
discussion of some potential responses to the theory's inadequacies.