WHY DOES THE SENATE WIN IN CONFERENCE COMMITTEE - A STABILITY EXPLANATION

Citation
Ld. Ortega et Lj. Mcquillan, WHY DOES THE SENATE WIN IN CONFERENCE COMMITTEE - A STABILITY EXPLANATION, Public choice, 87(1-2), 1996, pp. 101-116
Citations number
21
Categorie Soggetti
Economics,"Political Science
Journal title
ISSN journal
00485829
Volume
87
Issue
1-2
Year of publication
1996
Pages
101 - 116
Database
ISI
SICI code
0048-5829(1996)87:1-2<101:WDTSWI>2.0.ZU;2-B
Abstract
This paper develops a bicameral stability model wherein the conference committee serves as a vehicle for mutually advantageous bicameral exc hange. The goal is to maintain a single party's bicameral majority. Ma jority party leaders use the conference committee to attenuate the out lying positions of House standing committees that threaten the bicamer al majority. Conference outcomes favor the Senate because it is more v ulnerable to party turnover. Statistical results on data from the U.S. Congress, 1949 through 1991, demonstrate that when one party holds a bicameral majority, a relative increase in conference bills preserves at the margin, Senate majority-party seats at the expense of House maj ority-party seats.