POWER IN NETWORKS OF SUBSTITUTABLE AND COMPLEMENTARY EXCHANGE RELATIONS - A RATIONAL-CHOICE MODEL AND AN ANALYSIS OF POWER CENTRALIZATION

In this paper, I introduce a new measure of power in exchange networks under substitutable/complementary exchange relations. Although it is derived from a model based on a modification and extension of Coleman' s model of collective action, the new measure reflects major character istics of Emerson and Cook's power-dependence theory, in which power e merges as a result of exchange based on actors' benefit-maximizing act ions under network constraints on exchange. Ira the new measure, an ac tor's power depends on the number of exchange partners interested in t he actor's resource, the extent to which the actor's partners are not interested or are less interested in others' resources than in the act or's, the power of the actor's partners as interdependent correlates, and the consequences of shifts in demand made by the actor's partners under the substitutability/complementarity of exchange relations among their multiple partners. I also show high consistency between power d istributions predicted by the new measure and corresponding experiment al results by Cook et al. (1983), Yamagishi, Gilmore, and Cook (1988), and Skvoretz and Willer (1993). Finally using simulated exchange netw ork darn, I derive an enriched set of hypotheses about the structural and relational determinants of power centralization tinder closely sub stitutable exchange relations.