PRIMING, ANALOGY, AND AWARENESS IN COMPLEX REASONING

The mechanisms by which a concept used in solving one complex task can influence performance on another complex task were investigated. We t ested the hypothesis that even when subjects do not spontaneously make an analogy between two domains, knowledge of one domain can still spo ntaneously influence reasoning about the other domain via the mechanis m of priming. Four groups of subjects (two experimental and two contro l) were given a simulated biochemistry problem on Day 1 and a simulate d molecular genetics problem on Day 2. For the two experimental groups , the solution to the biochemistry problem involved inhibition. For th e two control groups, the solution did not involve inhibition. On Day 2, all subjects received the same version of the molecular genetics pr oblem in which the solution involved the concept of inhibition. Subjec ts in the experimental conditions were more likely to attain the corre ct answer, to propose inhibition, and to propose inhibition early in t he problem-solving session than were subjects in the control condition s. However, subjects in the experimental conditions made no reference to the biochemistry problem either in their verbal protocols or in a p ost-task questionnaire. The results are interpreted as demonstrating t hat an implicit process-priming-can make old knowledge available for c urrent problem solving.