CORE, VALUE AND EQUILIBRIA FOR MARKET GAMES - ON A PROBLEM OF AUMANN AND SHAPLEY

Authors
BUTNARIU D KLEMENT EP
Citation
D. Butnariu et Ep. Klement, CORE, VALUE AND EQUILIBRIA FOR MARKET GAMES - ON A PROBLEM OF AUMANN AND SHAPLEY, International journal of game theory, 25(2), 1996, pp. 149-160
Citations number
3
Categorie Soggetti
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods","Mathematical, Methods, Social Sciences
Journal title
International journal of game theory → ACNP
ISSN journal
00207276
Volume
25
Issue
2
Year of publication
1996
Pages
149 - 160
Database
ISI
SICI code
0020-7276(1996)25:2<149:CVAEFM>2.0.ZU;2-I
Abstract
In this note a partial solution of Open Problem 41C of Aumann and Shap ley [1974, pp. 250-251] is presented. A sufficient condition for the A umann-Shapley value of a market game to exist, to be contained in its core, and to be the competitive payoff distribution of a transferable utility competitive equilibrium is given. In this context, balancednes s and sigma-balancedness criteria for large classes of cooperative gam es are proven.