M. Landsberger et I. Meilijson, EXTRACTION OF SURPLUS UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION - THE CASE OF INSURANCEMARKETS, Journal of economic theory, 69(1), 1996, pp. 234-239
We consider a principal-agent setting with two types of risk averse ag
ents with different abilities to avoid losses. Abilities (types) are c
haracterized by two distributions F and G which are agents' private in
formation. All agents have the same increasing and strictly concave ut
ility function U, under which G has a higher certainty equivalent. In
this environment we derive a characterization of pairs of distribution
s under which a first best outcome can be achieved or approximated. We
prove that a first best outcome can be achieved if and only if the di
stribution F is not absolutely continuous with respect to tile distrib
ution G. If this condition is not satisfied, the first best outcome ca
n be approximated (arbitrarily close) if and only if the likelihood ra
tio dF/dG is unbounded. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.