The connections between family farms and the organizations linking the
m to the agrocommodity chains have been neglected in debates about the
reproduction of family farms. We use the example of cooperatives and
producer marketing boards in the main agricultural export industries o
f New Zealand to inform this debate. Regulation by central government
has been crucial to the establishment and continuance of producer mark
eting boards, especially in the face of substantial neoliberal critici
sm of their very existence. Critics of producer marketing boards-the N
ew Zealand Department of Treasury, nonfarm capitals, and one corporate
agriculturalist-argue on the basis of theoretical efficiency, but off
er little empirical evidence. Using insights from the family farm and
cooperation literatures, we argue that cooperatives and producer marke
ting boards help shield family farms from the full costs of market rel
ations, assist shareholders in capturing downstream profits, enable fa
rmers to develop and maintain ownership of new technology, reduce comp
etition among farmers, and allow farmers more control of their industr
ies than would otherwise be the case.