Biological warfare (BW) aerosol attacks are different from chemical at
tacks in that they may provide no warning/all clear signals that allow
the soldier to put on or remove his M17/M40 protective mask. Methods
are now being perfected to detect a BW aerosol cloud using an airborne
(helicopter) pulsed laser system to scan the lower altitudes upwind f
rom a troop concentration of corps size, and to sample and analyze the
nature of the aerosol within a brief time interval. This system has c
ertain limitations and vulnerabilities, since it is designed specifica
lly to detect a line-type aerosol attack. Provision of, training with,
and field use of a lightweight dust mist or HEPA filter respirator fo
r each soldier is proposed for protection against undetected aerosol a
ttacks. This particulate filter respirator would be issued in addition
to the M17/M40 mask. Such a BW respirator will be able to purify the
soldier's air by removing particles in the 0.3- to 15-mu m-diameter ra
nge with an efficiency of 98 to 100%. Particle size of BW aerosols is
in the same range, with an optimum size for high-efficiency casualty p
roduction of 1 to 5 mu m mass median diameter. The proposed BW respira
tor will be lightweight; will require low inhalation pressures; will b
e comfortable to wear for prolonged periods; will not interfere with v
ision, hearing, and communication; and will not degrade overall effect
iveness and performance to the degree observed with the M17/M40 masks.
Such respirators would be worn as part of a contingency defense again
st an enemy likely to use BW agents. This respirator could be worn for
prolonged periods when under threat of an undetectable BW attack duri
ng weather conditions favorable to the success of such an attack (i.e.
, low wind velocity and temperature inversion in the target area). In
addition, tactically important assets such as command and control cent
ers and missile batteries can also be protected continuously by air fi
ltration systems powered by electricity (modular collective protection
equipment). Vaccinations against anthrax, botulism, Q fever, plague,
and tularemia are now available and immune protection against ricin an
d staphylococcal toxins appears feasible in the near future. Chemother
apy can also be provided for prophylaxis of infectious agents released
on the battlefield. The vaccines and antibiotics can provide back-up
protection against an unexpected BW attack during a period when the BW
respirator is not in use or malfunctions due to a poor seal or filter
leak. Enemy sites of biological weapon production, assembly, testing,
and storage, and delivery vehicles can be targeted for destruction by
bombs and/or missiles. An integrated, well-planned, BW defense with m
ultiple components can decrease the likelihood of a successful enemy B
W aerosol attack.