STRATEGIES FOR THE PREVENTION OF A SUCCESSFUL BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AEROSOL ATTACK

Authors
Citation
Sl. Wiener, STRATEGIES FOR THE PREVENTION OF A SUCCESSFUL BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AEROSOL ATTACK, Military medicine, 161(5), 1996, pp. 251-256
Citations number
23
Categorie Soggetti
Medicine Miscellaneus
Journal title
ISSN journal
00264075
Volume
161
Issue
5
Year of publication
1996
Pages
251 - 256
Database
ISI
SICI code
0026-4075(1996)161:5<251:SFTPOA>2.0.ZU;2-6
Abstract
Biological warfare (BW) aerosol attacks are different from chemical at tacks in that they may provide no warning/all clear signals that allow the soldier to put on or remove his M17/M40 protective mask. Methods are now being perfected to detect a BW aerosol cloud using an airborne (helicopter) pulsed laser system to scan the lower altitudes upwind f rom a troop concentration of corps size, and to sample and analyze the nature of the aerosol within a brief time interval. This system has c ertain limitations and vulnerabilities, since it is designed specifica lly to detect a line-type aerosol attack. Provision of, training with, and field use of a lightweight dust mist or HEPA filter respirator fo r each soldier is proposed for protection against undetected aerosol a ttacks. This particulate filter respirator would be issued in addition to the M17/M40 mask. Such a BW respirator will be able to purify the soldier's air by removing particles in the 0.3- to 15-mu m-diameter ra nge with an efficiency of 98 to 100%. Particle size of BW aerosols is in the same range, with an optimum size for high-efficiency casualty p roduction of 1 to 5 mu m mass median diameter. The proposed BW respira tor will be lightweight; will require low inhalation pressures; will b e comfortable to wear for prolonged periods; will not interfere with v ision, hearing, and communication; and will not degrade overall effect iveness and performance to the degree observed with the M17/M40 masks. Such respirators would be worn as part of a contingency defense again st an enemy likely to use BW agents. This respirator could be worn for prolonged periods when under threat of an undetectable BW attack duri ng weather conditions favorable to the success of such an attack (i.e. , low wind velocity and temperature inversion in the target area). In addition, tactically important assets such as command and control cent ers and missile batteries can also be protected continuously by air fi ltration systems powered by electricity (modular collective protection equipment). Vaccinations against anthrax, botulism, Q fever, plague, and tularemia are now available and immune protection against ricin an d staphylococcal toxins appears feasible in the near future. Chemother apy can also be provided for prophylaxis of infectious agents released on the battlefield. The vaccines and antibiotics can provide back-up protection against an unexpected BW attack during a period when the BW respirator is not in use or malfunctions due to a poor seal or filter leak. Enemy sites of biological weapon production, assembly, testing, and storage, and delivery vehicles can be targeted for destruction by bombs and/or missiles. An integrated, well-planned, BW defense with m ultiple components can decrease the likelihood of a successful enemy B W aerosol attack.