A CONTRACTUAL MODEL OF THE VOTING-BEHAVIOR OF THE SUPREME-COURT - THEROLE OF THE CHIEF-JUSTICE

Political scientists have long debated the role of the Supreme Court i n public policymaking. Much of the debate has centered around the issu e of judicial independence from political factors. Despite a rather ex tensive debate in the literature, the question of independence has rar ely been subjected to systematic testing. This paper examines the role of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in linking decisions of the Court to the desires of Congress. Specifically, the paper focuses on the role of the Supreme Court Chief Justice as an agent of Congress th at reacts to budgetary signals sent by the Congress. The resulting rel ationship between budgets allocated to the Court and decisions reached by the Court are analyzed from 1946 to 1988. (C) 1996 by Elsevier Sci ence Inc.