SECURITY, BARGAINING, AND THE END OF INTERSTATE RIVALRY

I examine how security concerns affect if and when interstate rivals e nd their rivalries by settling their outstanding differences over impo rtant issues and ceasing to threaten each other militarily. I argue th at when leaders are simultaneously willing to accept some offered sett lement, a rivalry will end, and argue that security concerns affect th is willingness to accept different bargains. I hypothesize that extern al threats to the security of the rivals should increase leaders' will ingness to accept given offers, increasing the probability that a riva lry will end, while high-salience issues should make it less likely th at a rivalry will end. However, neither the dyadic power balance nor t he occurrence of war between rivals should affect rivalry termination. I propose a new operationalization of rivalries and their termination which centers on disputed issues. In a statistical analysis of rivalr ies from 1816 to 1988, I find that external military threats and low i ssue salience do positively affect the probability that rivalries will end, and that the dyadic balance of power, the occurrence of war, and bipolarity do not affect rivalry duration.