MANAGING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION - CONDEMN, STRIKE, OR ASSIST

The nonproliferation regime, which denies countries access to critical materials, makes it more likely that defiant proliferators will devel op unsafe arsenals. In order to manage proliferation, the U.S. could c ontinue to uphold the regime, hoping to persuade the proliferator to r eturn to non-nuclear status. It could attack, thereby ensuring that th e proliferator is unable to join the nuclear club. Or it could concede the nonproliferation goal and render assistance to address the attend ant safety concerns. Through a series of deductive models we argue tha t three factors are important in determining the right option: (1) U.S . preferences on proliferation, whether purist or pragmatist; (2) the proliferator's type, which can vary by size, affinity, and risk tolera nce; and (3) the phase in the proliferation process to which the proli ferator has advanced: preweaponization, after weaponization but before deployment, the deployment phase, and, finally, full deployment. We a nalyze the special case of proliferation by a small enemy of the Unite d States such as North Korea as a signaling game wherein each side att empts to push the outcome toward its own preferred equilibrium. The No rth Koreans prefer the equilibrium in which the United States never at tacks regardless of its type, whereas the United States prefers the eq uilibrium in which North Korea never deploys regardless of its type.