TRUST AND REACTIONS TO MESSAGES OF INTENT IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS

This study examined how low- and high-trust individuals react to messa ges of intended behavior in a social dilemma situation. Subjects playe d a two-person prisoner's dilemma; the opponent was a reciprocal strat egy programmed by the experimenter. During the game, subjects received a message stating that the opponent planned to be cooperative or comp etitive for the remainder of the game. In Study 1, low trusters reacte d to the competitive message by decreasing cooperation but were unaffe cted by the cooperative message; high trusters reacted to the cooperat ive message by increasing cooperation but were unaffected by the compe titive message. Study 2 showed that a period of unconditional, message -consistent behavior immediately after the message can make low and hi gh trusters responsive to cooperative and competitive messages, respec tively. However, the number of unconditional responses was crucial. Th e study also found that stated intention and message-inconsistent beha vior affect perceptions of the opponent's trustworthiness.