POWER AND SATISFACTION IN THE UNITED-NATIONS SECURITY-COUNCIL

The United Nations is under pressure to make the Security Council more representative of the membership. The formal literature on voting pow er has discovered much that can clarify this debate, and the present a nalysis gives a version of the Shapley-Shubik index of voting power th at considers likely alliances based on voting in the General Assembly since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Veto members occupying outlying positions, like China, have especially high voting power, whereas sta tes without vetoes hold almost none. However, power in itself is not t he goal; if another permanent member is already reliably voting as one wishes, obtaining a veto of one's own is unnecessary. Other benefits from membership are prestige and access to information. The current de bate seems at an impasse, but if these alternative goals are recognize d, other feasible solutions might be found.