EXTRACTION, ALLOCATION, AND THE RISE AND DECLINE OF STATES - A SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF 2-LEVEL SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Using realist models of international politics that deemphasize the tw o-level security game that states play, most analyses of hegemonic dec line argue thai decline is caused by the differential growth of power between hegemons and challenging states, The authors argue that declin e is affected highly by states' resource extraction and allocation dec isions, and thai the international and domestic consequences of these decisions must be analyzed. A model of how states respond to external and internal security threats is outlined and analyzed via computer si mulation. The authors find that states are likely to decline if they o veremphasize increasing capabilities to deter threats instead of alloc ating resources to reduce opponents' willingness to attack. In additio n, a more ''dovish'' allocation strategy can be very effective against internal threats. Thus the decline of hegemons and rise oi challenger s is determined as much by strategies as by constraints posed by the s ystem structure.