The authors deal with common sense and its part in scientific psycholo
gy. Common sense is defined as a network or basic logic relations enco
ded in language and shared by all competent users of a particular lang
uage. The authors point out the fact that common sense is not realized
and purposefully used in psychology. Very often, psychologists verify
hypotheses for acknowledgement of which a judgement is frequently suf
ficient and conclusions of which are included in generally shared comm
on sense. This tendency is documented by several well-known theories.
At their analysis, common sense is used as methodological means of pro
ving the pseudo-empiricity of these approaches. Both in theoretical an
d applied psychology, its reflection results in the more precisely def
ined formulation of hypotheses. The authors simultaneously stress the
fact that common sense cannot be used as an all-explaining principle f
or all spheres of psychology.