COSTLESS REVELATION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN A DUOPOLY

Authors
DEMOUGIN D TSCHERNIG R
Citation
D. Demougin et R. Tschernig, COSTLESS REVELATION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN A DUOPOLY, JITE. Journal of institutional and theoretical economics, 149(2), 1993, pp. 443-463
Citations number
32
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
JITE. Journal of institutional and theoretical economics → ACNP
ISSN journal
09324569
Volume
149
Issue
2
Year of publication
1993
Pages
443 - 463
Database
ISI
SICI code
0932-4569(1993)149:2<443:CROPII>2.0.ZU;2-G
Abstract
We examine a non-cooperative duopoly in order to study the consequence s of integration versus separation between management and ownership un der the assumption of moral hazard and adverse selection. We assert th at, if the private information is correlated across firms and the play ers are risk-neutral, there exists an equilibrium where the duopoly be have as if each of the owners were managing their firm. (JEL: D43, D82 , L21)