In this paper, I look at the reflexive political implications for the
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) of two incipient or actual pub
lic disputes about when certain items of scientific knowledge should h
ave been known, and consequently if and when certain actions should ha
ve been taken on the basis of this knowledge: (1) The case of a 'dying
smoker' suing a tobacco company for not printing health warnings on c
igarette packets in the 1960s, when the company should have known the
facts about thr effects of smoking on health; and (2) The case of a te
chnological disaster inquiry where the techology's proponents are accu
sed of culpable negligence on the grounds that they should have known
the facts about the effect of low temperature on the resilience of spa
ce-shuttle O-rings. When SSK's contingent and symmetrical understandin
g of knowledge is applied to these cases, it would appear that the ana
lytic conclusion - that it is naive and unrealistic to retroject state
s of knowledge, as the accusers do - sides with the account of the sit
uation given by the defence (who here are reactionary societal actors
like tobacco companies and NASA). Thus the epistemological radicalism
of SSK would appear to place it not merely as a neutral bystander, but
(much worse) as an active supporter of the 'wrong' side, politically-
morally speaking. Should SSK therefore abandon its epistemological rad
icalism in favour of politico-moral radicalism7 Which form of commitme
nt should we choose? Or can we, somehow choose both?