A main aim of public party funding was to present parties with opportu
nities to participate on equal terms in public debate and to finance t
heir ability to represent the general public. However, its impact on p
arty communication and on party-voter contacts is a neglected aspect o
f research in the field. This paper suggests a disparity between inten
tions and consequences, mirroring that observed in the effects of publ
ic party funding on party expenditure, inter-party competition and par
ty structure. This is illustrated by a case study of campaign finances
and party communication in Israel since the inception of public party
funding, with special attention to the 1992 elections, in which it sp
urred a shift to a 'top-bottom' model of campaigning and to a concentr
ation on the system management and ritualistic dimensions of electoral
communications. It came at the expense of messages geared to enlist s
upport for alternative prospective policies. The ensuing party-voter r
ifts and the effort to bridge them by reforming public party funding m
ay throw light on the problematics of public party funding in western
democracies and on the progress towards what have recently been termed
cartel parties.