A NOTE ON RESTRICTED MAJORITY RULES - INVARIANCE TO RULE SELECTION AND OUTCOME DISTINCTIVENESS

Recently, Karotkin (1993) has shown that in the symmetric uncertain di chotomous choice model the set of restricted majority rules (RMRs) is special in the sense that a member of this family of rules is always t he worst rule among the potentially optimal weighted majority rules (W MRs). In the current paper we establish two additional special propert ies of RMRs. First, given a particular configuration of the group memb ers' decisions, the collective choice is invariant to the selection of WMRs if it is invariant to the selection of RMRs. Second, given a par ticular decision profile, a potentially optimal WMR can result in a di stinctive collective choice which is different from the choice of any other potentially optimal WMR, if and only if it is a RMR.