POWER-POLITICS IN THE NEW SOUTH-AFRICA

A consensus on South Africa's transition from apartheid is crystallisi ng. According to it, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Natio nal Party (NP), which initially opened negotiations reluctantly and su spiciously, were subsequently transformed by the experience. They are said to have developed mutual trust, discounted questions of political power, and agreed to a constitution allowing the new democratic gover nment-predictably headed by the ANC-to commence instituting its politi cal programme. This piece takes exception to this on several scores. I t maintains that considerations of power, which vanish from the conven tional story, were central to the eventual settlement, and stresses tw o significant constraints on South Africa's new democracy. The governm ent, as was anticipated by the NP, is exposed to relentless pressure t o adopt policies preferred by capital, which exerts steady conservativ e influence on the ANC. Moreover, the terms negotiated in the interim constitution specifically protect the integrity of established bureauc racies, doubly constraining the democratic government. Conservative st ate interests fortify conservative economic interests, offsetting the social and economic radicalism of the ANC. The thesis presented here i s that the political bargain in South Africa provides significant prot ections for interests associated with the NP and blunts the powers of the ANC. As a result the ANC is struggling to satisfy promises of soci al transformation and is tempted to shift its political base from popu lar organisations to state bureaucracies. Thus, South Africa's politic al bargain is democratic in form, but is incipiently statist and conse rvative in substance.