The paper examines the relations between central banks and other macro
sectors in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, with respect to the
creation and distribution of seigniorage, taking Austria and Germany a
s a reference. In economies in transition, transfers of seigniorage fr
om the central bank to the government and to the banking sector may ap
pear as a natural way to soften the financial constraints of both sect
ors. We propose a simple framework for the analysis of central bank se
igniorage, based on the opportunity cost approach, and measure both th
e amount and allocation of seigniorage for the five countries in 1993,
We find central bank seigniorage to be approximately four times our b
enchmark value in Hungary, and thirty times in Romania (the latter due
to the high level of the inflation tax), In Hungary and Romania most
seigniorage is appropriated (as an interest rate subsidy) by the gover
nment; in Romania a large part also goes as a subsidy to the financial
sector, In none of the five countries we find that central banks reta
in an excessive amount of seigniorage for reserve accumulation or for
current expenditures. In the last part of the paper we discuss the imp
lications of our findings on seigniorage for the evaluation of central
bank independence vis-a-vis the government.