In the UK in October 1992, Mrs S was forced to have a caesarean sectio
n despite her objections to such a procedure on religious grounds. The
case once again called into question rite obligations of women to the
unborn, and also whether one person can be forced to undergo a medica
l procedure for the benefit of someone else. Re S, like the case of An
gela Carder, is often discussed in terms of the conflict between mater
nal and fetal rights. This paper looks instead at our obligations to s
ave life in general - whether or not we are pregnant - and at the obli
gations of mothers to their children whether they are born or unborn.
Drawing on Judith Jarvis Thomson's distinction, it argues that minimal
decency, informs the duties which ale owed to strangers, but that par
ents can be expected to behave as Good Samaritans towards their childr
en. Finally, it is argued that even if mothers are ethically obliged t
o consent to caesarean sections which will save the lives of their bab
ies, this does not necessarily mean that others are at liberty, or eve
n obliged, to proceed with such operations without their consent.