A CASE-STUDY OF ELECTORAL MANIPULATION - THE MEXICAN LAWS OF 1989 AND1994

The Mexican electoral laws of 1989 and 1994 are used as a case study t o illustrate a point: the logical and mathematical properties defined in law have significant practical consequences. The 1989 law is an ext reme case of logical inconsistency and ignorance of the properties of rules of apportionment, and as such provides a rich menu of the proper ties rules for apportioning seats should satisfy. The 1994 law, at fac e value more reasonable, is an illustration of how innocuous looking r ules can yield real political advantage. Both laws can engender anomal ous and contradictory results; and both reveal an inattention to eleme ntary concepts of equity which cannot go unnoticed in view of Mexico's current turmoils. An electoral law defines the transformation of numb ers (populations and votes) into numbers (political representation to political power), and so defines a mathematical function. The politica l and legal men who devise such functions are perhaps wise to the wile s of men, and sometimes even to the subtleties of arithmetic rules, bu t the professional advice of those competent in the ways of functions would bring benefits in accuracy, rigor and clarity, if not equity, to the formulation of electoral law. Copyright (C) 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd.