FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE - RESOLVING CONFLICT AMONG SCHEMATA

Schematic conflict occurs when evidence is interpreted in different wa ys (for example, by different people, who have learned to approach the given evidence with different schemata). Such conflicts are resolved either by weighting some schemata more heavily than others, or by find ing common-ground inferences for several schemata, or by a combination of these two processes. Belief functions, interpreted as representati ons of evidence strength, provide a natural model for weighting schema ta, and can be utilized in several distinct ways to compute common-gro und inferences. In two examples, different computations seem to be req uired for reasonable common-ground inference. In the first, competing scientific theories produce distinct, logically independent inferences based on the same data. In this example, the simple product of the co mpeting belief functions is a plausible evaluation of common ground. I n the second example (sensitivity analysis), the conflict is among alt ernative statistical assumptions. Here, a product of belief functions will not do, but the upper envelope of normalized likelihood functions provides a reasonable definition of common ground. Different inferenc e contexts thus seem to require different methods of conflict resoluti on. A class of such methods is described, and one characteristic prope rty of this class is proved.