RATIONAL PREFERENCE - DECISION-THEORY AS A THEORY OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY

In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well develop ed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, 'util ity' and 'preference' do not have a single clear and uncontroversial m eaning. How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purpo ses in pursuit of which one wants to put decision theory to use. One m ight want to use it as a model of economic decision-making, in order t o predict the behavior of corporations or of the stock market. In that case, it might be useful to interpret the technical term 'utility' as meaning money profit. Decision theory would then be an empirical theo ry. I want to look into the question of what 'utility' could mean, if we want decision theory to function as a theory of practical rationali ty. I want to know whether it makes good sense to think of practical r ationality as fully or even partly accounted for by decision theory. I shall lay my cards on the table: I hope it does make good sense to th ink of it that way. For, I think, if Humeans are right about practical rationality, then decision theory must play a very large part in thei r account. And I think Humeanism has very strong attractions.