We use computer simulations to show how social fragmentation and conse
quent social loss can result from six innocuous cognitive and behavior
al assumptions. These assumptions govern individuals' choices with res
pect to each other and are independent of processes associated with fr
agmentation in various classical literatures. We model ''society'' as
a set of individuals who encounter each other in circumstances that pe
rmit potentially productive bur also risky relationships with each oth
er. Individuals (1) have the option of playing Prisoner's Dilemma game
s with others they encounter, but they do nor have to; (2) have prefer
ences over mutual cooperation and free-riding outcomes; (3) have expec
tations about each other's play; (4) have observable cateogry ''tags''
; (5) can modify their future responses to ''tagged'' individuals base
d on experience; (6) can search out partners they believe represent go
od prospects for productive relationships. In these terms, the only co
ndition necessary for fragmentation to emerge is that some circumstanc
e makes the probability of encounters across ''tagged'' categories une
qual, and a difference in sizes of categories, however slight, is suff
icient to do that. Same difference in category sizes is, for practical
purposes, inevitable, and thus so are pressures toward fragmentation.