UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN PSYCHIATRY - SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES

Citation
D. Dewhurst et Ipb. Watson, UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN PSYCHIATRY - SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 30(3), 1996, pp. 382-388
Citations number
20
Categorie Soggetti
Psychiatry,Psychiatry
ISSN journal
00048674
Volume
30
Issue
3
Year of publication
1996
Pages
382 - 388
Database
ISI
SICI code
0004-8674(1996)30:3<382:UADIP->2.0.ZU;2-C
Abstract
Objective: The aim of this paper is to provide a defence of diversity in psychiatry and, correspondingly, to show that strict 'biologism' (o r any other 'total' approach to psychiatry) is inappropriate. Method: Arguments are developed using as a basis the writings of well known ph ilosophers such as Stephen Toulmin, Joel Feinberg and Charles Taylor, The authors examine the concepts of explanation and causation and cons ider the consequences for psychiatry which might follow the acceptance of mind-brain identity. There is also a discussion of the concept of a person. Result: If the same phenomenon is subject to explanation fro m diverse psychiatric perspectives, it does not follow that these mode s of explanation must exclude or be in competition with each other. Th ey may in fact be necessary to each other if psychiatry is to provide a full picture of mental functioning and human conduct, The thesis of mind-brain identity does not eliminate the variety of discourses withi n psychiatry, and hence it does not provide a rationale for 'biologism '. Conclusion: There is a need for a co-operative multidimensional app roach in psychiatry.