THE INDETERMINACY OF COLOR-VISION

A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors s upports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibl y be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remai ning options are certain forms of color realism according which famili ar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual envi ronment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that fam iliar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiate d nowhere. I argue that there is simply no fact of the matter as to wh ich of these remaining options is correct. I blame this indeterminacy on the fact that color vision exhibits several of the hallmarks of a m odular input system, as described by Jerry Fodor in The Modularity of Mind. Finally, I speculate that the range of live options falling with in the scope of the indeterminacy may be even broader than initially i ndicated.