POWER AND POLITICAL COORDINATION IN AMERICAN AND GERMAN MULTICHAMBER LEGISLATION

Power in American and German multi-chamber legislation is determined e ither by an inter-institutional or an internal coalition problem of al l interlinked chambers. Hence, the complexity of multi-chamber systems relies on different subgames, different types of decision rules and d ifferent types of actors. Since collective actors such as parliaments or parliamentary chambers may not act as unitary actors, we examine th e power distribution in both types of multi-chamber legislation by a g ame-theoretical method with regard to institutional settings and speci fic legislative schemes. We argue that the Shapley index is the most a ppropriate method for the comparative analysis of multi-chamber power. Our 'parallel' research strategy is, thus, based on individual and co rporate Shapley power shares which are subsequently added to collectiv e chamber power. Our comparison of American and German legislation sta rts with an analysis of two-chamber parliamentary bargaining. Whereas this application corresponds to the bicameral parliamentary decision s tage of conciliation and amending, our second application of Policy Le adership studies the checks-and-balances of all executive and legislat ive chamber actors. A third application is related to the situation of unified and divided government, and here we examine the power effects of institutional settings and party-oriented strategies in both types of multichamber legislation. In Germany, unified government excludes opposition actors, whereas American unified and divided government ref ers to the president's role in multi-chamber legislation.