FROM JOINT IMPLEMENTATION TO A SYSTEM OF TRADEABLE CO2 EMISSION ENTITLEMENTS

A system of tradeable CO2 emission entitlements is an appealing approa ch to combat global warming at least from the theoretical point of vie w. But, when examining in more detail the possible criteria for distri butions of CO2 entitlements-such as grandfathering or distribution per capita-it appears that an international agreement on the implementati on of the entitlement system without introductory measures is quite im probable. The most important criterion that will determine whether suc h a distribution hey mill indeed be accepted is neglected, that is, th e willingness to pay. Much has been written about the structures and t heoretical advantages of joint implementation and tradeable permits Bu t greenhouse gas emission reductions achievable with joint implementat ion as a single instrument will not be sufficient to protect the earth 's atmosphere. At the same time, a system of tradeable emission Entitl ements is unlikely to be established. This article suggests introducin g the system of tradeable CO2 emission entitlements gradually, using s tages of joint implementation in a stepwise manner. Using joint implem entation to enter an entitlement system allows industrialized countrie s to adapt their self-defined emission quotas to their willingness to pay. The narrower the target, the higher the costs will be to avoid em issions in one's own country or elsewhere. The net-payers establish th e level to which their emissions may rise without interferences, and t he net-recipients distribute the available emission rights among thems elves according to other criteria. Such ct differentiation of target d efinitions may not completely eliminate the difficulties of finding a consensus, but at least may reduce them.