Kg. Nyborg et S. Sundaresan, DISCRIMINATORY VERSUS UNIFORM TREASURY AUCTIONS - EVIDENCE FROM WHEN-ISSUED TRANSACTIONS, Journal of financial economics, 42(1), 1996, pp. 63-104
We use when-issued transactions data to assess the Treasury's current
experiment with uniform auctions. When-issued volume is higher under u
niform as compared to discriminatory auctions, suggesting a higher inf
ormation release, which should;reduce pre-auction uncertainty and the
winner's curse. Under uniform auctions, when-issued volatility falls a
fter the auction and again after the outcome announcement. The pattern
is the opposite for discriminatory auctions. This is further evidence
that uniform auctions increase pre-auction information and lower the
short squeeze. A direct comparison of markups in uniform and discrimin
atory auctions yields mixed results.